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As the total of the world’s refugees, displaced persons, and asylum seekers continues to 
grow – having crossed the 60 million mark for the first time since World War II – na-
tion states are faced with a seemingly unprecedented challenge, confronted as they are 
with uncontrollable mass population flows.1 Between Australian “off-shoring” policies, 
	 For	a	comprehensive	overview	of	the	European	perspective	on	its	current	refugee	crisis,	see	the	official	website	
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European regimes veering towards the extreme right and blocking refugees from crossing 
their borders, and Israel’s ensuing constitutional crisis due to governmental anti-migrant 
policies, few issues are nowadays more hotly contested than adherence to the universal 
tents of non-refoulement.2 This unequivocal “negative” duty upon states not to turn asy-
lum seekers back into the hands of their tormentors has always been amongst the hardest 
international legal obligations for states to accommodate.3
The non-refoulement of refugees (also known as the “Prohibition on Expulsion or Re-
turn”) forms the bedrock of all international refugee protections. It prohibits states from 
returning refugees to places where their lives or freedoms would be endangered on the 
grounds of their ethnicity, race, gender, or religion. This “seemingly simple moral imper-
ative, of not returning refugees into the hands of their tormentors merely because of who 
they are” actually poses the greatest challenge to nation states, as they cease under these 
circumstances to be the sole determinants as to who shall enter their territory.4 While the 
original drafting of non-refoulement legislation took almost three years to accomplish 
(1949–1951), the clause finally adopted into the 1951 Refugee Convention’s Final Act of 
contains some of the strongest prohibitive language of any modern treaty:
Art. 33: No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.5
At the heart of all the debates regarding non-refoulment’s applicability lies one funda-
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A case in point is provided by the deep rift in legal interpretation between the European 
Court of Human Rights and the US Supreme Court as to whether non-refoulement 
protection applies ex-territorially on the high seas. From the late 1980s, following the 
overthrow of Haitian dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, more and more boats 
of migrants began arriving clandestinely on the shores of Florida. Many of these migrants 
were political dissidents who had been persecuted by the Haitian security forces and 
were, therefore, eligible for refugee status on the grounds of political persecution. From 
1992 onwards, the Republican Bush administration instructed the US Coast Guard to 
conduct “push back” operations of these vessels, away from American – and even inter-
national – territorial waters, back to the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince. Following the 
successful appeal of pro-refugee non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to the US 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Bush administration appealed to the US 
Supreme Court against the Appeals’ Court decision to apply the non-refoulement princi-
ple on the high seas, between Florida and Haiti. In its decision, the US Supreme Court, 
headed by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, reversed the plea and sided with the US 
government’s “push back” operations, providing them with a mantle of legality.
Reading Article 33 textually, the US Court ruled that the high seas were not “a territory” 
and hence, the non-refoulement principle did not apply in them. In his powerful dis-
senting opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun, who was appalled by the intellectual dishon-
esty of his peers in interpreting Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, wrote:
What is extraordinary in this case is that the Executive, in disregard of the law, would 
take to the seas to intercept fleeing refugees and force them back to their persecutors – and 
that the Court would strain to sanction that conduct.6
However, the most stringent criticism of the US Supreme Court’s decision came in 2012 
from none other than the European Court of Human Rights, in its own ruling against 
Italy (one of the executives under its purview), which, like the US over Haiti, had un-
dertaken “push back” operations against boat-going refugees on the Mediterranean Sea, 
who had left the coast of Libya in order to seek refuge on Italian shores. The European 
Court adopted a diametrically opposed interpretation of Article 33 to that of the US 
Supreme Court. In his concurring opinion, Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque referred 
to the American position in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council as follows:
With all due respect, the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation contradicts the 
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vention relating to the Status of Refugees and departs from the common rules of treaty 
interpretation.7
In contrast to legal commentaries in academic journals, this is an unusually strong state-
ment from a high court judge towards his peers across the Atlantic. It is noteworthy to 
recall here that Judge Albuquerque was not merely writing on his own behalf but rather 
in the name of the entire European Court’s Grand Chamber, given the unanimousness 
of the verdict and the lack of any European judicial dissent.
This paper will demonstrate that non-refoulement does indeed entail a limit to nation-
state sovereignty – and does so without qualification, despite the efforts of some powerful 
1951 Refugee Convention delegates - who insisted otherwise. 
2.  Non Refoulement Overrides National Sovereignty  
at the Outset of the 1951 Refugee Convention’s Drafting
The idea that there is indeed a fundamental contradiction between the non-refoulement 
obligations of states and their own sovereignty, in the sense of their ability to exercise full 
control over who enters their territory, is certainly not new. In fact, it was strikingly evi-
dent to the drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and it proved to be one of the most 
contested issues in the three-year drafting process (travaux préparatoires) of that treaty.
The dilemma is a basic one. If states assert full control over their borders, and are entitled 
to “push back” refugees and asylum seekers who throng to their frontiers for protec-
tion, then universalist legal refugee protections are rendered meaningless. If on the other 
hand, states are stripped of their unbridled ability to control who crosses their frontiers, 
being bound to accept refugees who enter their territory, even clandestinely, and are pro-
hibited from blocking their entry or forcefully turning them back in any manner what-
soever (as Art. 33 stipulates), then one must concede that their sovereignty has indeed 
been qualified in favour of a higher, universalist legal principle. As Jacob Robinson – the 
Holocaust-surviving Israeli representative – told the delegates to the Refugee Conven-
tion’s very first drafting session of the UN-ECOSOC’s (the UN Economic and Social 
Council’s) Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness in February 1950:
The principal factor lies in the exceptional limitation of the sovereign right of States to 
turn back refugees to the frontiers of their country of origin.8
That no reservation could be tabled to Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and 
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to be penalized for this action (Art. 31 – Non-Penalization) are rightfully seen as further 
strengthening elements of this breach of nation-state sovereignty.
This conundrum was all too clear to the drafters of the Refugee Convention, and from 
its earliest stages the Convention’s text was subject to continuous debates concerning 
this very point. The Ad Hoc Committee’s chairman – Ambassador Chance of Canada 
– framed the debate in distinctly clear terms:
The Committee was confronted with a dilemma. If it wished to grant the greatest possible 
number of guarantees to refugees, it met with resistance from delegations which had the 
greater good of their Governments at heart. If, on the other hand, it tried to safeguard the 
sovereign rights of States to the greatest possible extent, it was liable to draw up a conven-
tion which would be unfavourable to refugees. The solution obviously lay in finding the 
lowest common denominator in those opposing interests.9
In a clear preference for the universalist “horn” of this dilemma, the renowned interna-
tional jurist Louis Henkin, who represented the United States on the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee, proclaimed his country’s preference for the supremacy of a refugee’s rights over and 
above nation-state sovereignty considerations:
Whatever the case might be […] he [i.e. the refugee – GBN] must not be turned back to 
a country where his life or freedom could be threatened. No consideration of public order 
should be allowed to overrule that guarantee.10
It was not until the end of the Ad Hoc Committee’s second session, in August 1950, 
once a full-blown and comprehensive draft for the entire Refugee Convention text was 
put forward, that most of the diplomatic delegations began seriously considering its text 
with their respective headquarters in the various national capitals. The UK’s approach is 
worth mentioning in this regard. The British Inter-ministerial Committee, which was to 
oversee the consecutive developments of the UK’s drafting notes for the Refugee Con-
vention, was only established after the positive conclusion of ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Com-
mittee’s second round of talks. In his top-secret report to the British Cabinet, issued one 
month after this session, the British delegate (and former home secretary) Samuel Hoare 
explained the problems that faced governments as they came to discuss the non-refoule-
ment clause:11
The United Kingdom representative invited the other representatives present to say wheth-
er their governments were prepared to take the serious step of surrendering their powers 
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member of the Ad Hoc committee) was the only country which said straight out that it 
could not accept the Article.12
Hoare’s report to Cabinet should be seen in its correct context in and around the drafting 
stage of the 1951 Refugee Convention text, as it stood after the Ad Hoc Committee’s 
second session in August 1950. While advocates of universalism rightly point to the fact 
that already, by this early drafting stage, a comprehensive articulation of non-refoule-
ment was at hand (and was then still known as Article 28 of the draft Convention text), 
it would be a mistake to infer that this text was indeed endorsed by the majority of 
governments. The Ad Hoc Committee was certainly not representative of most govern-
ments, having had merely 12 member states present as delegates. Nor did the text of the 
Refugee Convention as it stood in 1950 fully represent governments’ views. If anything, 
it was a nuanced representation of the views of the UN and IRO (International Refugee 
Organization) secretariats, given that the office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was still in the making (the UNHCR’s creation was only 
fully secured in December 1950). In the end, both the UN and IRO secretariats and the 
participating governments knew full well that the most important diplomatic hurdles 
would inevitably arise at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, where, ultimately, the UN 
secretariats would lose much of their grip over the Convention texts being drawn up.
3.  The Political Camps and their Attitude towards Non Refoulement  
at the 1951 Refugee Convention
The literature concerning non-refoulement is exhaustive, and the deliberations regard-
ing the different stages that the text underwent until its final endorsement have been 
well researched.13 Nevertheless, one important point worth mentioning in this regard 
concerns the strengthening of the legal text on non-refoulement (now known in its fi-
nal numbering as Article 33) at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries. It was during this 
conference that the words “in any manner whatsoever” were added to the prohibition 
of refoulement, so as to strengthen the treaty by further limiting the ability of states to 
interpret its text with ill intent and mauvaise foi. This textual strengthening, specifically 
within the article most associated with the qualification and limitation of nation-state 
sovereignty, is one of the unique features of the 1951 Refugee Convention – its like has 
seldom been observed in the treaty-making processes of other international humanitar-
ian law instruments.
It is against this backdrop, and the very specific example set by the drafters of the non-
refoulement article, that one must ponder how exactly the US Supreme Court arrived at 
its ill-advised conclusion that this principle did not apply on the high seas – in this case, 
2	 UK	National	Archives	London	–	Kew,	BT	27/349,	 Inter-ministerial	Oversight	Committee	 for	 the	drafting	of	a	
Convention	for	Refugees,	25	September	950,	p.	28.
3	 See	the	literature	mentioned	in	notes	3,	4,	and	5	above.
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vis-à-vis Haitian asylum seekers off the coast of Florida. To be sure, for the drafters of 
the 1951 document, it would be safe to say that for the Convention’s president – Danish 
representative, Knud Larsen – no article in the entire text was more important and in 
greater need of securing.14 That this article was certainly intended to specifically cover 
refugees on the high seas is was made absolutely clear to the Venezuelan delegate by his 
Belgian and French peers, as early as 1950.15
This is the point to recall the proclamation by Henkin – the US delegate to the 1951 
Refugee Convention, in favour of non-refoulement’s legal superiority over sovereignty 
considerations, back in 1950.16 A close reading of the US Supreme Court’s Sale v. Hai-
tian Centers Council is revealing, given the cardinal methodological error in the historical 
reading of the 1951 Refugee Convention’s travaux préparatoires undertaken by the judges 
of the majority opinion in reaching that verdict. Any court that engages (or, perhaps we 
should say, indulges) in the intricacies of a treaty’s travaux invariably accepts their validity 
for the interpretation of the treaty in question. In fact, one would be hard pressed to find 
instances in which either of the usual textual or intentionalist approaches is totally dis-
regarded by a court. In most cases, courts will consider both approaches before applying 
what suits them best for that given case. The example of non-refoulement is no different. 
Both the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights based their ver-
dicts (at least partially) on quotations from the 1951 Refugee Convention’s travaux. The 
difference, however, lies in the manner in which each court delved into these historical 
materials. In order to explain this difference, and the resulting divergence in interpreta-
tion, a brief survey of the drafting process of the 1951 Convention, and the compilation 
of its travaux, is merited.
The drafting history of the 1951 Refugee Convention can be broken down into three 
periods, roughly according with the compilation of its drafting materials. The first period 
– between the 1949 memorandum of the UN Secretary-General, requesting work to 
begin towards a UN Refugee Convention, and its accompanying letters – is mainly de-
clarative, and encompasses materials from the UN secretariat that do not, as such, consist 
of binding legal materials since they do not represent the ideas of treaty-member states. 
The second period (1950) comprises the deliberations of UN-ECOSOC’s two sessions 
of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and related problems. It was here that the first 
“blueprints” of the Refugee Convention text were articulated. The third period consists 
of the deliberations during the diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries (2–28 July 
1951), when the final text was worked over and endorsed by vote, article by article, by 
the state-parties’ plenary. Full accounts of the second and third periods are available in 
bound format, as these deliberations were edited and then published by ECOSOC’s 
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day, morning and afternoon), on UN-letterheaded paper, with the full names of all par-
ticipants and a protocol-based account of the speaker and his main points.17 
At its outset, the 1951 Refugee Convention was intended to solve the refugee problems 
primarily of Europe. The countries represented at the drafting table were broadly di-
vided into what commonly became known as the ‘Europianists vs. Universalists’ political 
camps. Concerning  non refoulement, the ‘Europeanists’ advocated for a broad scope of 
protection for refugees, yet within the limited geographical area of Europe. The ‘Uni-
versalists’ (also known as ‘the countries of immigration: the US, Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand), advocated for a single Convention to be applied the world over. Yet in 
contrast to the ‘Europianists’, the protections they were prepared to afford refugees were 
much more limited in scope, and certainly did not include non refoulement protection 
for refugees at sea.18 
The fact that the ‘Europeanists’ were prepared to afford more protections to post World 
War II refugees they were hosting, also had to do with the experiences of that war, 
which affected several of the key drafters who were holocaust-surviving Jews. This group 
included Robinson from Israel, Lewin (the NGO representative who first drafted non-
refoulement) and UNHCR’s own Paul Weis. To them one must add the diplomats who 
actively helped rescue Jews from the Nazis during that war such as Hoare from the UK, 
President Larsen from Denmark, and Vice President Herment from Belgium.19  
The question here was one of moral high ground. The immigration countries (The US, 
Canada, Australia) on the other side of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans did not have to 
bear the brunt of the European refugee crisis.20 When it came to non refoulement, these 
countries, already during early drafting stages announced that they would not see the 
conduct of “push back” operations at sea – as refoulement.21 As we shall see – little has 
changed over the past six odd decades in the diametrically opposed positions advocated 
by the US and Australia versus those adhered to by many European nations.22 One area 
where this cardinal difference is most apparent is in the very different interpretations of 
Supreme Courts on both sides of these oceans concerning the geographical reach which 
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in interpretation lies the methodological differences through which both Courts chose 
to examine the same historical drafting sources. 
4.  Mass Population Flows and Non-Refoulement’s Deliberate  
Misinterpretation in the 1951 Refugee Convention’s Travaux Préparatoires
A glance at both opinions, of the US Supreme Court and of the European Court, reveals 
one simple fact. In both cases, the 1951 Refugee Convention’s Travaux Préparatoires were 
invoked. However, in the US Supreme Court’s opinion, delivered by Justice John Paul 
Stevens, the right honourable judge in fact “cherry-picked” statements by the Swiss and 
Dutch delegates from three single sessions (3, 11, and 25 July 1951) of the Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries so as to suit the predetermined and premeditated conclusion that 
he wished to convey. Stevens’ approach was not in fact about interpreting the treaty, 
but rather about finding statements within the travaux that would suit the textual read-
ing he wished to apply. In contrast, the European Court’s opinion includes a lengthy 
deliberation on the entire travaux – starting from the second period (1950), when the 
non-refoulement principle came into being (2 February 1950). Its concurring opinion 
only then follows through the entire development of Article 33’s drafting, until its final 
version in the Final Act. Consequently, Judge Albuquerque took time to expose the 
inconsistencies in the very passages quoted by Judge Stevens of the US Supreme Court 
vis-à-vis the full development of the Article over its three-year drafting process.
The entire issue turns on three statements made by Zutter, the Swiss delegate to the 
July 1951 Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Geneva, prior to the endorsement of the 
Convention’s Final Act. These statements were followed up by the Dutch representative, 
Baron Von Boetzler, during the very last reading of the entire Convention text, prior to 
its signature and its becoming the known Final Act. All three statements revolved around 
the issue of whether states were still bound to uphold non-refoulement in the event of 
mass population flows, when sizeable waves of refugees undertake an exodus from their 
native lands across national borders. On the second day of the Conference of Plenipo-
tentiaries, the Swiss delegate declared:
The Swiss delegation considered, however, that it went without saying that the Contract-
ing States must also undertake to help each other and to assist a country invaded by a 
mass-influx of refugees because of its geographical position, by relieving it of the some of 
the refugees it had admitted. It was obvious that a small country could not accept an 
unlimited number of refugees without endangering its very existence.23
The context here is quite clear. During the very early deliberations, the Swiss delegate was 
calling for an official mechanism of burden-sharing once mass population flows arose. 
23	 UN	Doc.	A/CONF.2/SR3,	pp.	9–0,	Statement	of	Zutter	(Delegate	of	Switzerland).	Conference	of	Plenipotentiar-
ies,	3rd	July	95.
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It is important to stress here that the delegate was not in any way qualifying the non-
refoulement principle, but rather wished to press for a structured mechanism for refugee 
burden-sharing between the Convention’s High Contracting Parties.
The second instance in which the non-refoulement principle and the situation of mass 
population flows collided took place in the midst of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, 
during the very contentious discussions concerning Article 3 (Non-Discrimination). The 
central question here was whether states were entitled to discriminate between refugees 
who had entered their territory lawfully under their immigration laws and those who had 
clandestinely transgressed national borders in their flight from torment – the latter be-
ing the “classic” case in which non-refoulement’s utmost humanitarian necessities would 
come into play. Against the opinions of the majority of the representatives present, the 
Swiss delegate now proclaimed his minority opinion – certainly not accepted by the ma-
jority of the delegates present – for the qualification of non-refoulement in the case of a 
mass population flow. In the course of a heated discussion regarding the exact meaning 
of “refoulement” (that is, the “turning away” of a refugee), the Swiss delegate outlined for 
the first time the stark distinction that he saw between refugees who had already entered 
a country’s territory and those who had now been stranded once the borders had been 
sealed by that country:
The Swiss Government considered that in the present instance the word [i.e. “refoule-
ment” – GBN] applied solely to refugees who had already entered a country, but were 
not yet resident there. According to that interpretation, States were not compelled to allow 
large groups of persons claiming refugee status to cross its frontiers.24
The Swiss delegate’s conflation of terms here, of non-expulsion with non-refoulement, 
is quite clear. He stated that the Swiss government would graciously not expel a refugee 
who had already entered its territory, but would not adhere to the non-refoulement 
principle at its border. This conflation of terms, between non-expulsion (of refugees 
already in country) and non-refoulement (of refugees actually attempting to cross over 
into a state) is very indicative of the fundamental difference in the legal meaning of terms 
which the 1951 Refugee Convention brought about.  
As both White and Caestecker demonstrate in their contributions to this volume, in the 
1930s non refoulement was in fact tantamount to non-expulsion, as states kept abso-
lute sovereignty over their border policies. The states who did join international refugee 
instruments during the interwar period, be it the Convention of 1933 for the Russian 
refugees, or the Convention of 1938 for the Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany, limited 
their international commitments only to those refugees who had already resided law-
fully within their territories. Non refoulement in both Conventions (1933 and 1938) 
restricted the expulsion of those refugees who already had been granted asylum, or who 
24	 UN	Doc.	A/CONF.2/SR6,	Statement	of	Zutter	 (Delegate	of	Switzerland),	Conference	of	Plenipotentiaries,	th	
July	95.
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were merely authorized to reside in the country, while border policy remained a sole 
national competence. 
The majority of the delegates at the 1951 Plenipotentiaries’ Conference accepted a much 
further commitment for their states under their newly-formulated universal internation-
al refugee regime. This was the interpretation of non refoulement which was accepted 
by the majority of the delegates at the Plenipotentiaries’ Conference, which came now 
to include refugees who were actively seeking to transgress a state’s border so as to save 
their life. With this view in mind, one can understand why both acts (non-expulsion and 
non-refoulement), to which the Swiss delegate referred in his statement, later became the 
substantive legal bedrocks (along with non-penalization) upon which the entire interna-
tional refugee regime was founded, as enshrined in Articles 31, 32, and 33 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention.
The third reference to the Swiss delegate’s reading of non-refoulement – as if it might 
not apply under conditions of mass population flows – was made by the Dutch delegate 
to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 25 July 1951, during the second (afternoon) 
session of that day. In what was, in fact, the very last statement of the entire Refugee 
Convention’s drafting process, during the final session of the Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries – which had involved three years of drafting debates and several thousand pages of 
protocols. In his statement from this very last session, the Dutch delegate stated:
Article 28 [i.e. Non-Refoulement, which finally was renumbered to become Article 
33 – GBN] would not have involved any obligations in the possible case of mass migra-
tions across frontiers or of attempted mass migrations. The Netherlands could not accept 
any legal obligations in respect of large groups of refugees seeking access to its territory. At 
the first reading the representatives of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Sweden had supported the Swiss interpretation […] he wished to 
have it placed on record that the Conference was in agreement with the interpretation 
that the possibility of mass migrations across frontiers or of attempted mass migrations 
was not covered by article 33.
There being no objection, the PRESIDENT ruled that the interpretation given by the 
Netherlands representative should be placed on record […] He then declared the United 
Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons 
closed, except for the signing ceremony.25
It was to this statement that Justice Stevens of the US Supreme Court referred in his 
majority opinion in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, and it is here that the grave meth-
odological errors of statement “cherry-picking” come to light in their most overt and 
harmful manner.
What was at stake in this statement, and why was it made? 
25	 UN	Doc.	A/CONF.2/SR.35,	Statement	of	Baron	Von	Boetzler	(Netherlands),	25th	July	95,	Afternoon	Session	2:30	
PM.
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What was the exact purpose and meaning of this statement as it was placed on record, 
for protocol’s sake, upon the explicit demand of the Dutch delegate?
The correct answer to these questions is inextricably intertwined with the context within 
which the statement was uttered. The entire drafting process of the Refugee Convention 
had been plagued, from its outset, by a conflict between states who wished to limit refu-
gee protections, and those who wished to expand them. Time and again, as some coun-
tries attempted to limit the scope of the Convention to deal with conditions like those 
recently experienced by European refugees from Nazi Germany or post-war refugees, 
they were rebutted by other nations who refused to adhere to clauses which would harm 
refugees and reduce their protection threshold. This was precisely the case concerning 
Article 1 (Definition of the Term “Refugee”), which India and Pakistan for example, took 
to ECOSOC’s session at the 5th General Assembly, where they simply outvoted certain 
European countries, adopting a universalist rather than a limited “European” definition 
of ratione personae and the scope of who qualified for recognition as a refugee.26 The 
countries who wanted to limit refugee protections could neither outvote them nor twist 
the Refugee Convention’s text in favour of their limited readings – and no article was 
more explicit and indicative of their failure to dominate the drafting of the Convention 
text as the non-refoulement clause (Art. 33). At the end of the day Von Boetzler simply 
failed to convince the majority of nation states present at the drafting table, to qualify 
non-refoulement when faced with mass population flows.
The three points that unequivocally prove this failure concern the very nature of the 
strengthening of the non-refoulement clause in the face of the challenges mounted 
against it at this very last drafting stage of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries.
The first proof has to do with the strengthening of the language of the non-refoulement 
clause, as the words “in any manner whatsoever” were deliberately inserted into its text 
at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries. These words came to deliberately disqualify any 
contingent argument that might be made to qualify the applicability of non-refoulement 
in certain circumstances. The insertion of these words, in the teeth of the attempt by 
Western states to qualify non-refoulement in the case of mass population flows, should 
be read for what it is – namely, a rejection of the notion that non-refoulement was to be 
limited in such circumstances.
The second proof concerns the stipulation as to the inadmissibility of reservations by the 
High Contracting Parties to Article 33. According to Article 46, no contracting state can 
make a reservation vis-à-vis the non-refoulement clause. This idea was reinforced once 
non-refoulement had attained the status of jus cogens (supreme legal principle). If indeed 
Von Boetzler was convinced that the majority of states accepted his interpretation of 
non-refoulement as not applying in conditions of mass population flows, why did he not 
table an amendment to officially qualify its applicability under those conditions? 
26	 Gilad	Ben-Nun,	From	Ad	Hoc	to	Universal:	The	International	refugee	regime	from	Fragmentation	to	Unity,	 in:	
Refugee	Survey	Quarterly	34	(2),	pp.	23–44,	at	37	n.	55.
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Surely, if most states agreed with him, would they not have accepted that qualification? 
After all, that is precisely what took place with the issue of national security when it 
was to be put at risk by non-refoulement. And indeed, with regard to national security 
needs, the UK succeed in persuading most states to accept this qualification, which is 
present in the Convention to this day as Paragraph 2 to Article 33.27 Yet most states were 
not in accord with the view of limiting the scope and applicability of non-refoulement 
concerning mass-population flows, which is precisely why no amendment to qualify its 
applicability under such conditions was never tabled. 
The third, and perhaps most convincing, proof as to the failure to convince most nation 
states to qualify non-refoulement - when faced with mass population flows, concerns the 
demand by the Dutch delegate to place his words on record. While being a point of proof 
of a procedural nature, this situation holds a strong methodological lesson for diplomatic 
historians and legal scholars engaged in the interpretation of international legal treaties; 
When do delegates demand that their words be put on record?
In most cases, it is due to them thinking that their position is the correct one, while being 
outvoted or blocked by a majority of the representatives at that particular assembly. This 
is not to say that that delegate did not have a point, nor does it hold any bearing towards 
any ontological truth that his claim might have had. History is full of examples of vener-
able minoritarian voices who demanded that their words be put on record, only to be 
subsequently (and tragically) confirmed in their views and warnings. Edmund Burke’s 
call for concessions to the British colonies in North America during the early 1770s and 
Beneš’ outcry at the 1938 Munich conference, when the world succumbed to Hitler’s 
demands for the Sudetenland, are but two examples.
These examples, however, prove the point. In these two latter instances, irrespective of 
their ontological truth and prophetic foresight, Burke’s and Beneš’ were strictly minori-
tarian voices. This was all the more relevant with regard to the statement made by the 
Dutch delegate during the final session of the 1951 Refugee Convention’s Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries. To most delegates present – and most probably to the president, 
Knud Larsen, who had championed non-refoulement as his own personal cause – Von 
Boetzler’s declaration would have sounded like no more than a diplomatic statement 
of “sour grapes,” and an affirmation of the non-attainability of his efforts to limit and 
qualify non-refoulement in the cases of mass population flows.28
To be sure, Von Boetzler was not the only delegate at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
to demand that his words be put on the record when his opinion had not been endorsed 
by the majority of the other delegates present. Three days earlier, Jacob Robinson had 
attempted for his part to persuade the delegates not to accept Germany’s amendment to 
Article 1 F, which was intended to strike out of the Convention’s text any reference to 
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Robinson saw this action on Germany’s behalf, at the very first international conference 
that it had attended since Hitler had resigned from the League of Nations, as part of “the 
process of ‘forgive and forget’ which was taking place in Germany” with regard to the 
Jewish Holocaust.30 Upon his failure to convince the other delegates of his point of view, 
Robinson requested that his speech concerning the Nazi past and the responsibility of 
Germany for the Holocaust be entered into the record as his statement in extenso.31 In 
both cases, that of Robinson and that of Von Boetzler,  the statements entered the records 
for protocol’s sake – nothing more.
President Larsen was not going to oppose the Dutch delegate over his abstrusely false 
claim that “the Conference was in agreement with the interpretation that the possibility 
of mass migrations across frontiers or of attempted mass migrations was not covered by 
article 33.” Both Larsen and Von Boetzler, and most of the other delegates present, knew 
full well that the Dutch delegate was placing on record his personal view in a shrewd 
diplomatic manoeuvre so as to place into the Refugee Convention’s protocol minutes 
his false misinterpretation of (if not an outright misrepresentation about) the meaning 
of non-refoulement. Larsen’s ruling in favour of recording Von Boetzler’s words should 
under no circumstances be seen as an acceptance of his view, let alone of his claim that 
most states agreed with his interpretation of non-refoulement. For Larsen, what mat-
tered was what was entered into the Final Act, and here non-refoulement was expounded 
in the strongest form: “in any manner whatsoever.” Little did Larsen know just how far 
the intellectual dishonesty of supreme courts wishing to support their own executives 
would go.
4. Conclusion
That the US Supreme Court based its false judgment in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council 
on a statement that one of its presiding judges (Justice Stevens) selected from well over 
3,000 pages of statements in the 1951 Refugee Convention’s travaux préparatoires is 
alarming in more than one respect. One wonders what was worse: that the judges of one 
of the most respected high courts the world over failed to contextualize a false statement 
by a defeated delegate, and read it wrongly – or, alternatively, that the bench had already 
reached its judgment and only looked to the travaux to provide a crooked justification for 
its unacceptable decision. The minority dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun certainly 
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mistake in good faith by Justice Stevens, given the tendency of international lawyers to 
haphazardly cherry-pick statements from various Conventions’ travaux préparatoires. 
This tendency, however, becomes especially alarming when one is engaged in the inter-
pretation of treaties of international humanitarian law, in which a change in interpreta-
tion of the scope or meaning of terms could directly affect human lives – as in the case of 
the reversal of European refugee policy on Mediterranean waters thanks to the European 
Court of Human Rights’ 2012 ruling in Hirsii Jam’aa v. Italy.32
From the earliest drafting stages of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the clash between the 
universalist tenets of non-refoulement on the one hand and the requirements of national 
sovereignty, in the form of total control upon the entry of persons into a state’s sovereign 
territory, on the other was absolutely clear to the drafting delegates. That they chose to 
strengthen the wording of the non-refoulement clause by inserting the words “in any 
manner whatsoever” at its final drafting stage during the Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
demonstrates their deliberate and clear rejection of any limitation upon its application. 
The obstacles to non-refoulement – in the form of challenges to a state’s national security, 
or the case of mass population flows – were well known and heatedly debated during the 
Convention’s three-year drafting process. In the case of the needs of national security, 
the drafters indeed chose to limit non-refoulement through the insertion of Paragraph 
2 of Article 33. In the case of mass population flows, they chose not to qualify it despite 
recurrent calls to this end by certain delegates.
And rightly so, for in many cases it is precisely in and during humanitarian catastrophes 
– ones which trigger mass-refugee flows, that the non-refoulement principle is most 
needed. As Holocaust survivors or those who had attempted to help Jewish refugees as 
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very well acquainted with conditions of mass populations flows – some of which had 
taken place only a few years prior to the Convention’s drafting, during World War II. 
It is within this context that one must understand their insertion of the words “in any 
manner whatsoever” into the text – in direct reference to the ample cases of refoulement 
that had indeed taken place during that conflict – be these of Jews aboard the MS St. 
Louis off the coast of Cuba, of Gypsy and Roma communities fleeing Nazi persecution in 
the Balkans, or of native Czech communities driven out of the Sudetenland by the armed 
forces of the Third Reich. Thus, when the US Supreme Court decides to falsely utilize 
the 1951 Refugee Convention’s travaux préparatoires so as to justify an intellectually 
dishonest and deliberate misinterpretation of this international treaty, it not only renders 
an insult to the layperson’s intelligence (as its own Justice Blackmun so eloquently re-
marked) but it also does methodological harm, by sanctioning the conduct of “cherry 
picking” of statements from the drafting records of international treaties. After all – if 
Supreme Court judges behave this way, what claim can one forward against individual 
international lawyers or academics, who merely repeat the same methodologically-flawed 
practice. Fortunately, though - and for all its faults, Europe still has its Court of Human 
Rights where judges such as Pinto de Albuquerque still take the time and effort to scruti-
nize the entire record of a treaty – before they render their judgment on its meaning. 
Beyond the specificities of non-refoulement’s application in cases of mass-population 
flows, there lies the more general methodological principle of how Supreme Courts 
ought to work with travaux préparatoires, which at the end of the day – are in their na-
ture historical source materials in the ‘classical’ sense. If and when Supreme Courts do 
turn to travaux préparatoires in search for help in interpreting a treaty, they must do so 
in the same manner as a good and thorough historian would treat his source materials. 
They must first read the entire travaux préparatoires available to them, and not merely 
focus on the substantive provisions. This means for example, paying attention to the 
legally non-binding resolutions which we usually find at the end of many treaties, and 
to which Courts seldom turn precisely due to their non-bindingness.33 A good knowl-
edge of the historical circumstances and a reaching-out to standard historical works so 
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as to understand the psychological and zeitgeist context under which the drafters were 
operating – would also be of good sense.  If there is one thing they ought not to do – it 
is to resort to the practice of “cherry picking” statements which is methodologically and 
factually indefensible. 
The drafters of non refoulenment in the 1951 Refugee Convention understood full-well 
the inherent sovereignty-limiting qualities which the adoption of this principle, in its 
current wording (“in any manner whatsoever”), would ipso facto entail. Six decades on, 
the fundamental rift between the continental European understanding of non-refoule-
ment - as adopted by the European Court for Human Rights in 2012, and that of the 
countries across the oceans (as expressed by the Supreme Courts of the US and Australia) 
is still very much alive and kicking.
